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Abstract
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an efficient no-regret learning al-
gorithm for decision problems modeled as extensive games. CFR’s regret bounds
depend on the requirement of perfect recall: players always remember information
that was revealed to them and the order in which it was revealed. In games without
perfect recall, however, CFR’s guarantees do not apply. In this paper, we present
the first regret bound for CFR when applied to a general class of games with im-
perfect recall. In addition, we show that CFR applied to any abstraction belonging
to our general class results in a regret bound not just for the abstract game, but for
the full game as well. We verify our theory and show how imperfect recall can
be used to trade a small increase in regret for a significant reduction in memory in
three domains: die-roll poker, phantom tic-tac-toe, and Bluff.
1 Introduction
Many real-world problems can be modeled as a repeated decision-making task. For
problems involving multiple agents, one can model the repeated task as a normal-form
game. When the task incorporates sequential decisions involving imperfect informa-
tion or stochastic events, an extensive game is a useful alternative. In such decision
problems, a typical goal is to minimize regret: the amount of utility lost by playing a
past sequence of strategies, versus playing the best, stationary strategy in hindsight.
In this paper, we consider the problem of minimizing regret in an extensive game.
A common approach to achieving low regret in extensive games is the Counterfactual
Regret Minimization (CFR) [Zinkevich et al., 2008] algorithm. CFR uses a regret
minimizer at every decision point with an alternative notion of regret, which provably
minimizes regret in the entire extensive game. However, convergence is limited to
games exhibiting perfect recall: players never forget information that was revealed
to them, nor the order in the which the information was revealed. For games with
imperfect recall, CFR’s original analysis provides no general guarantees.
Imperfect recall brings about a number of complications. In games with per-
fect recall, every mixed strategy (probability distribution over pure strategies) has a
utility-equivalent behavioral strategy (probability distribution over actions at each de-
cision point) [Kuhn, 1953]. While certain lossless imperfect recall games share this
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property [Kaneko and Kline, 1995], it is not true for imperfect recall games in gen-
eral [Piccione and Rubinstein, 1996]. In addition, the decision problem of determining
if a player can assure themself a certain payoff in an imperfect recall game is NP-
complete [Koller and Megiddo, 1992]. Two-player zero-sum games can be solved
by constructing an appropriate linear program [Koller et al., 1994] or minimizing re-
gret [Zinkevich et al., 2008], provided the game has perfect recall. Without perfect re-
call, however, the problem becomes exponential in the worst case [Koller et al., 1994].
On the other hand, imperfect recall extensive games are more versatile than perfect
recall games for modelling large real-world problems. While perfect recall requires all
past information to be remembered, imperfect recall allows irrelevant information to be
forgotten so that the size of the game is smaller. As CFR’s memory requirements are
linear in the size of the game, more games become feasible through imperfect recall.
Despite the complications above, CFR has empirically been shown to work well when
applied to imperfect recall abstractions of Texas Hold’em poker [Waugh et al., 2009b],
but there is currently no theory to suggest why this is so.
This paper presents theoretical groundings for applying CFR to games exhibiting
imperfect recall. We define a general class of imperfect recall games and provide a
bound on CFR’s regret in such games. For a subset of this class, CFR minimizes aver-
age regret in the extensive game. Moreover, our results also provide regret guarantees
when applying CFR to an abstract game, provided the abstract game belongs to our
general class. We test our theory in three different domains: die-roll poker, phantom
tic-tac-toe, and Bluff. To the best of our knowledge, this work demonstrates the first
theoretically-grounded, practical use of imperfect recall in extensive games.
2 Background
An extensive-form game Γ with imperfect information [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]
is a tuple 〈N,A,H,Z, P, σc, u, I〉, where N is a finite set of players. A is a finite set
of actions. H is a finite set of histories: a subset of the set of sequences of elements in
A. A prefix of a history h′ ∈ H is a history h ∈ H where h′ begins with the sequence
h; we denote prefix histories by h v h′. For every h ∈ H , define A(h) = {a : a ∈
A, ha ∈ H}, the set of valid actions at history h; P (h) ∈ N ∪ {c} is the player to act
at the history h, or chance if P (h) = c; and Hi = {h | h ∈ H,P (h) = i}. Z ⊆ H is
the set of terminal histories. A terminal history z ∈ Z is a history where there does
not exist any history h ∈ H , h 6= z such that z v h. The utility function ui : Z → R
gives the utility to player i ∈ N , for each terminal history. If |N | = 2 and for all
z ∈ Z,∑i∈N ui(z) = 0, we say the game is zero-sum.
For each player i ∈ N , Ii is a partition of Hi with the property that A(h) = A(h′)
whenever h and h′ are in the same member of the partition. We call Ii the information
partition of player i, and a set I ∈ Ii is an information set of player i. A player,
when taking actions, cannot distinguish between two histories in the same information
set. For I ∈ Ii we denote A(I) as the set A(h) for any h ∈ I . Define I(h) to be
the information set containing h. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to games where
players cannot reach the same information set twice in a single game. Thus, we assume
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that for all i ∈ N and h, h′ ∈ Hi,
h v h′, h 6= h′ ⇒ I(h) 6= I(h′). (1)
Finally, σc is the fixed “strategy” of the special player chance. σc(h, a) gives the
probability that chance event a occurs at h. For all h ∈ Hc,
∑
a∈A(h) σc(h, a) = 1 and
the decisions at any h are independent of the decision at any other h′ 6= h.
Given a history h, define Xi(h) to be the sequence of information set, action pairs
such that (I, a) ∈ Xi(h) if I ∈ Ii and there exists h′ v h such that h′ ∈ I and h′a v h.
The order of the pairs in Xi(h) is the order in which they occur in h. Define X(h) to
be the sequence of information set, action pairs belonging to all players in the order in
which they occur in h, and X−i(h) similarly, by removing player i’s information set,
action pairs from X(h). Also, define X(h, h′) to be the sequence of information set,
action pairs belonging to all players that start at h and end at h′ when h v h′; if h 6v h′,
X(h, h′) is defined to be the empty sequence. Finally, Xi(h, h′) and X−i(h, h′) are
similarly defined.
Definition 1. An extensive game has perfect recall if for every player i ∈ N , for every
information set I ∈ Ii, for any h, h′ ∈ I : Xi(h) = Xi(h′). Otherwise, the game has
imperfect recall.
Intuitively, with perfect recall every player has an infallible memory: they cannot
“forget” anything during a play of the game that they once knew. Hence, what a player
knows at I is a composition of what the player has discovered in the past up to this point
and the precise order in which information was discovered. Note that every perfect
recall game satisfies equation (1), but not every imperfect recall game does.
A (behavioral) strategy σi for player i is a function such that for each history
h ∈ Hi, σi(h) is a probability distribution over A(h). Furthermore, it is required that
σi(h) = σi(h
′) for all h, h′ ∈ I , and we denote that as σi(I). The set of all such
strategies for player i is denoted by Σi. A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a collection of
strategies, one for each player, i.e. in a two-player game σ = (σ1, σ2). By notational
convention, σ−i refers to the set of strategies including every strategy in σ except player
i’s strategy.
For any σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ N ∪{c}, and h ∈ H , define piσi (h) =
∏
h′avh,P (h′)=i σi(h
′, a)
to be the probability that player i plays to reach history h under σ. We can then define
piσ(h) =
∏
i∈N∪{c} pi
σ
i (h) to be the probability that history h is reached under σ. Let
piσ−i(h) be the product of all players’ contribution (including chance) except that of
player i. Furthermore, let piσi (h, h
′) be the probability of player i playing to reach his-
tory h′ after h, given h has occurred. Let piσ(h, h′) and piσ−i(h, h
′) be defined similarly.
Finally, we can define the expected utility of a strategy profile σ for player i to be
ui(σ) = Ez∈Z [ui(z)] =
∑
z∈Z
ui(z)pi
σ(z).
We will say that a game Γ′ = 〈N,A′, H, Z, P, σc, u, I ′〉 is an abstraction, or an
abstract game, of Γ = 〈N,A,H,Z, P, σc, u, I〉 if for all i ∈ N and h, k ∈ Hi,
A′(h) ⊆ A(h) and I(h) = I(k) implies I ′(h) = I ′(k). In this paper, we only consider
abstractions where A = A′. A typical use of abstraction is to reduce the size of the
game by ensuring that |I ′| < |I|.
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3 Example: Die-Roll Poker
We now introduce a game that we will use as a running example throughout the paper.
Die-roll poker (DRP) is a simplified two-player poker game that uses dice rather
than cards. To begin, each player antes one chip to the pot. There are two betting
rounds, where at the beginning of each round, players roll a private six-sided die. The
game has imperfect information due to the players not seeing the result of the oppo-
nent’s die rolls. During a betting round, a player may fold (forfeit the game), call
(match the current bet), or raise (increase the current bet) by a fixed number of chips,
with a maximum of two raises per round. In the first round, raises are worth two chips,
whereas in the second round, raises are worth four chips. If both players have not
folded by the end of the second round, a showdown occurs where the player with the
largest sum of their two dice wins all of the chips in the pot.
DRP is naturally a game with perfect recall; players remember the exact sequence
of bets made and the exact outcome of each die roll from both rounds. However,
consider an imperfect recall version of DRP, DRP-IR, where at the beginning of the
second round, both players “forget” their first die roll and only know the sum of their
two dice. In other words, DRP-IR is an abstraction of DRP where any two histories
are in the same abstract information set if and only if the sum of the player’s private
dice is the same and the sequence of betting is the same. DRP-IR has imperfect recall
since histories that were distinguishable in the first round (for example, a roll of 1 and
a roll of 4) are no longer distinguishable in the second round (for example, a roll of 1
followed by a roll of 5, and a roll of 4 followed by a roll of 2).
4 Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Given a sequence of strategy profiles σ1, σ2, ..., σT , the (external) regret for player i,
RTi = max
σ′∈Σi
T∑
t=1
(
ui(σ
′, σt−i)− ui(σti , σt−i)
)
,
is the amount of utility player i could have gained had she played the best single strat-
egy in hindsight for all time steps t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. An algorithm minimizes regret,
or is a no-regret algorithm, for player i if the average positive regret approaches zero;
i.e., limT→∞R
T,+
i /T = 0, where x
+ = max{x, 0}. Having no regret is a desirable
property. For example, it is well known that in a zero-sum game, if both players’ aver-
age regret is bounded above by , then the average of the strategy profiles generated is
a 2-Nash equilibrium.
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an iterative no-regret learning al-
gorithm for extensive-form games having perfect recall. On each iteration t, CFR
recursively traverses the entire game tree, computing the expected utility for player i
at each information set I ∈ Ii under the current profile σt, assuming player i plays to
reach I . This expectation is the counterfactual value for player i,
vi(σ, I) =
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z)pi
σ
−i(z[I])pi
σ(z[I], z),
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where ZI is the set of terminal histories passing through I and z[I] is the prefix of z
contained in I (z[I] is unique by equation (1)). For each action a ∈ A(I), these values
determine the counterfactual regret at iteration t, rti(I, a) = vi(σtI→a, I)− vi(σt, I),
where σI→a is the profile σ except at I , action a is always taken. The regret rti(I, a)
measures how much player i would rather play action a at I than play σt. Finally, σt
is updated by applying regret matching [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, Zinkevich et al.,
2008] to the immediate counterfactual regrets,RTi (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 r
t
i(I, a), according
to
σT+1(I, a) =
RT,+i (I, a)∑
b∈A(I)R
T,+
i (I, b)
,
with actions chosen uniformly at random when the denominator is zero. Regret match-
ing is a no-regret learner that minimizes the per-information set immediate counterfac-
tual regret,
max
a∈A(I)
RTi (I, a)
T
≤ ∆i
√|A(I)|√
T
, (2)
where ∆i = maxz,z′∈Z ui(z)−ui(z′). In games having perfect recall, minimizing the
immediate counterfactual regrets at every information set in turn minimizes average
regret, RTi /T . This is because perfect recall implies that the regret is bounded by
the sum of the positive parts of the immediate counterfactual regrets [Zinkevich et al.,
2008],
RTi ≤
∑
I∈Ii
max
a∈A(I)
RT,+i (I, a), (3)
and thus
RTi
T
≤ ∆i|Ii|
√|Ai|√
T
, (4)
where |Ai| = maxI∈Ii |A(I)|. CFR must store the immediate counterfactual re-
gret for each information set, action pair, and thus CFR’s memory requirements are
O(|Ii||Ai|).
While equation (2) still holds in imperfect recall games, equation (3) and conse-
quently equation (4) are not guaranteed to hold. An example game where CFR would
exhibit high regret is provided in Section 7. Consequently, the regret for playing ac-
cording to the CFR algorithm is unknown in general for imperfect recall games. How-
ever, the advantage of applying CFR to DRP-IR, for example, is that this imperfect
recall game contains fewer information sets than the full game, and thus less memory
is required by CFR. Although DRP is a toy example and is small enough to run CFR
on the full game, this example is useful for understanding the concepts in the rest of
this paper.
5 CFR with Imperfect Recall
In this section, we investigate the application of CFR to games with imperfect recall.
We begin by showing that CFR minimizes regret for a class of games that we call “well-
formed games.” We then present a bound on the average regret for a more general class
of imperfect recall games that we call “skew well-formed games.”
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5.1 Well-formed Games
For games Γ = 〈N,A,H,Z, P, σc, u, I〉 and Γ˘ = 〈N,A,H,Z, P, σc, u, I˘〉, we say
that Γ˘ is a perfect recall refinement of Γ if Γ˘ has perfect recall and Γ is an abstraction
of Γ˘. So, the information available to players in Γ˘ is never forgotten, and is at least as
informative as the information available to them in Γ. For example, DRP is a perfect
recall refinement of DRP-IR. Every game has at least one perfect recall refinement by
simply making Γ˘ a perfect information game (I˘ = {h} for all I˘ ∈ I˘i). Furthermore, a
perfect recall game is a perfect recall refinement of itself. For I ∈ Ii, we define
P˘(I) = {I˘ | I˘ ∈ I˘i, I˘ ⊆ I}
to be the set of all information sets in I˘i that are subsets of I . Note that our notion of
refinement is similar to the one described by Kaneko & Kline (1995). Our definition
differs in that we consider any possible refinement, whereas Kaneko & Kline consider
only the coarsest such refinement.
Definition 2. For a game Γ and a perfect recall refinement Γ˘, we say that Γ is a well-
formed game with respect to Γ˘ if for all i ∈ N , I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I), there exists a
bijection φ : ZI˘ → ZI˘′ and constants kI˘,I˘′ , `I˘,I˘′ ∈ [0,∞) such that for all z ∈ ZI˘ :
(i) ui(z) = kI˘,I˘′ui(φ(z)),
(ii) pic(z) = `I˘,I˘′pic(φ(z)),
(iii) In Γ, X−i(z) = X−i(φ(z)), and
(iv) In Γ, Xi(z[I˘], z) = Xi(φ(z)[I˘ ′], φ(z)).
We say that Γ is a well-formed game if it is well-formed with respect to some perfect
recall refinement.
Recall that ZI is the set of terminal histories containing a prefix in the informa-
tion set I , and that z[I] is that prefix. Intuitively, a game is well-formed if for each
information set I ∈ Ii, the structures around each I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I) of some perfect re-
call refinement are isomorphic across four conditions. Conditions (i) and (ii) state
that the corresponding utilities and chance frequencies at each terminal history are
proportional. Condition (iii) asserts that the opponents can never distinguish the corre-
sponding histories at any point in Γ. Finally, condition (iv) states that player i cannot
distinguish between corresponding histories from I˘ and I˘ ′ until the end of the game.
Consider again DRP as a perfect recall refinement of DRP-IR. In DRP, the available
actions are independent of dice outcomes, and the final utilities are only dependent on
the final sum of the players’ dice. Therefore, in DRP the utilities are equivalent be-
tween, for example, the terminal histories where player i rolled a 1 followed by a 5,
and the terminal histories where player i rolled a 4 followed by a 2 (condition (i)). In
addition, the chance probabilities of reaching each terminal history are equal (condi-
tion (ii)). Furthermore, the opponents can never distinguish between two isomorphic
histories since player i’s rolls are private (condition (iii)). Finally, in DRP-IR, player i
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never remembers the outcome of the first roll from the second round on (condition (iv)).
Thus, DRP-IR is well-formed with respect to DRP, with constants kI˘,I˘′ = `I˘,I˘′ = 1.
Any perfect recall game is well-formed with respect to itself since P˘(I) = {I}, φ
equal to the identity bijection, and kI˘,I˘′ = `I˘,I˘′ = 1 satisfies Definition 2. However,
many imperfect recall games are also well-formed, with DRP-IR being one example.
An additional example is presented in Section 6.
We now show that CFR can be applied to any well-formed game to minimize aver-
age regret. A sketch of the proof is described below, while a full proof is provided as
supplementary material.
Theorem 1. If Γ is well-formed with respect to Γ˘, then the average regret in Γ˘ for
player i of choosing strategies according to CFR in Γ is bounded by
R˘Ti
T
≤ ∆iK
√|Ai|√
T
,
where K =
∑
I∈Ii maxI˘,I˘′∈P˘(I) kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ .
Proof sketch. One can show that conditions (i) to (iv) of Definition 2 imply that the
positive regrets are proportional between any two information sets in Γ˘ that are merged
in the well-formed game, Γ. In other words, for all I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I), and a ∈ A(I),
RT,+i (I˘ , a) = kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′R
T,+
i (I˘
′, a).
Since regrets between Γ and Γ˘ are additive, i.e.,
RTi (I, a) =
∑
I˘∈P˘(I)
RTi (I˘ , a) for all I ∈ Ii,
the proportionality implies that minimizing regret at each I ∈ Ii minimizes regret at
each I˘ ∈ I˘i. Because Γ˘ has perfect recall, applying equation (3) gives the result. 
Since the strategy space is more expressive in Γ˘ than in Γ (Σ ⊆ Σ˘), RTi ≤ R˘Ti
and thus it immediately follows that the average regret in Γ is minimized. In the case
when Γ has perfect recall, because Γ is well-formed with respect to itself, Theorem
1 with K = |Ii| is a direct generalization of the original CFR bound in equation (4).
Theorem 1 not only guarantees regret minimization for perfect recall games, but also
for well-formed imperfect recall games.
5.2 Skew Well-formed Games
We now present a generalization of well-formed games to which a regret bound can
still be derived.
Definition 3. For a game Γ and a perfect recall refinement Γ˘, we say that Γ is a skew
well-formed game with respect to Γ˘ if for all i ∈ N , I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I), there exists
a bijection φ : ZI˘ → ZI˘′ and constants kI˘,I˘′ , δI˘,I˘′ , `I˘,I˘′ ∈ [0,∞) such that for all
z ∈ ZI˘ :
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(i)
∣∣∣ui(z)− kI˘,I˘′ui(φ(z))∣∣∣ ≤ δI˘,I˘′ ,
(ii) pic(z) = `I˘,I˘′pic(φ(z)),
(iii) In Γ, X−i(z) = X−i(φ(z)), and
(iv) In Γ, Xi(z[I˘], z) = Xi(φ(z)[I˘ ′], φ(z)).
We say that Γ is a skew well-formed game if it is skew well-formed with respect to some
perfect recall refinement.
The only difference between Definitions 2 and 3 is in condition (i). While utilities
must be exactly proportional in a well-formed game, utilities in a skew well-formed
game must only be proportional up to a constant δI˘,I˘′ . Note that any well-formed
game is skew well-formed by setting δI˘,I˘′ = 0.
For example, consider a new version of DRP called Skew-DRP(δ) with slightly
modified payouts at the end of the game. Whenever the game reaches a showdown,
player 1 receives a bonus δ times the number of chips in the pot from player 2 if
player 1’s second die roll was even; otherwise, no bonus is awarded. The pot is then
awarded to the player with the highest dice sum as usual. Analogously, define Skew-
DRP-IR(δ) to be the imperfect recall abstraction of Skew-DRP(δ) where in the second
round, players only remember the sum of their two dice. Now, Skew-DRP-IR(δ) is not
well-formed with respect to Skew-DRP(δ). To see this, note that the utilities resulting
from the rolls 1,5 and the rolls 4,2 and the same sequence of betting are not exactly
proportional because the second roll 5 is odd but 2 is even (utilities are off by δ times
the pot size). However, Skew-DRP-IR(δ) is skew well-formed with respect to Skew-
DRP(δ) with δI˘,I˘′ = δ times the maximum pot size attainable from I .
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that regret will be minimized by CFR in a
skew well-formed game. However, we can still bound regret in a predictable manner
according to the degree that the utilities are skewed:
Theorem 2. If Γ is skew well-formed with respect to Γ˘, then the average regret in Γ˘
for player i of choosing strategies according to CFR in Γ is bounded by
R˘Ti
T
≤ ∆iK
√|Ai|√
T
+
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|δI ,
where K =
∑
I∈Ii maxI˘,I˘′∈P˘(I) kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ and δI = maxI˘,I˘′∈P˘(I) δI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ .
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. Theorem 8 shows that as T approaches
infinity, the bound on our regret approaches
∑
I∈Ii |P˘(I)|δI . Our experiments in Sec-
tion 6 demonstrate that as the skew δ grows, so does our regret in Skew-DRP(δ) after a
fixed number of iterations.
Remarks. Theorems 1 and 8 are, to our knowledge, the first to provide such theo-
retical guarantees in imperfect recall settings. However, these results are also relevant
with regards to regret in the full game when CFR is applied to an abstraction. Recall
that if Γ has perfect recall, then Γ is a perfect recall refinement of any (skew) well-
formed abstract game. Thus, if we choose an abstraction that yields a (skew) well-
formed game, then applying CFR to the abstract game achieves a bound on the average
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regret in the full game, Γ. This is true regardless of whether the abstraction exhibits
perfect recall or imperfect recall. Previous counterexamples show that abstraction in
general provides no guarantees in the full game [Waugh et al., 2009a]. In contrast, our
results show that applying CFR to an abstract game leads to bounded regret in the full
game, provided we restrict ourselves to (skew) well-formed abstractions. If such an
abstract game is much smaller than the full game, a significant amount of memory is
saved when running CFR.
6 Empirical Evaluation
To complement our theoretical results, we apply CFR to both players simultaneously in
several zero-sum imperfect recall (abstract) games, and measure the sum of the average
regrets for both players in a perfect recall refinement (the full game). Along with
the small DRP domain and its variants, we also consider the challenging domains of
phantom tic-tac-toe and Bluff, which we now describe.
Phantom tic-tac-toe. As in regular tic-tac-toe, phantom tic-tac-toe (PTTT) is
played on a 3-by-3 board, initially empty, where the goal is to claim three squares
along the same row, column, or diagonal. However, in PTTT, players’ actions are
private. Each turn, a player attempts to take a square of their choice. If they fail due to
the opponent having taken that square on a previous turn, the same player keeps trying
to take an alternative square until they succeed. Players are not informed about how
many attempts the opponent made before succeeding. The game ends immediately
if there is ever a connecting line of squares belonging to the same player. The winner
receives a payoff of +1, while the losing player receives−1. In PTTT, the total number
of histories |H| ≈ 1010.
Bluff. Bluff, also known as Liar’s Dice, Dudo, and Perudo, is a dice-bidding game.
In our version, Bluff(D1,D2), each die has six sides with faces 1 to 6. Each player i
rolls Di of these dice and looks at them without showing them to the opponent. Each
round, players alternate by bidding on the outcome of all dice in play until one player
claims that the other is bluffing (i.e., claims that the bid does not hold). A bid consists
of a quantity of dice and a face value. A face of 6 is considered “wild” and counts
as matching any other face. For example, the bid 2x5 represents the claim that there
are at least two dice with a face of 5 (or 6) among both players’ dice. To place a new
bid, the player must increase either the quantity or face value of the current bid; in
addition, lowering the face is allowed if the quantity is increased. The player calling
bluff wins the round if the opponent’s last bid is incorrect, and loses otherwise. The
losing player removes one of their dice from the game and a new round begins, starting
with the player who won the previous round. When a player has no more dice left, they
have lost the game. A utility of +1 is given for a win and −1 for a loss. In this paper,
we restrict ourselves to the case where D1 = D2 = 2. Note that since Bluff(2,2) is a
multi-round game, the expected values of Bluff(1,1) are precomputed for payoffs at the
leaves of Bluff(2,1), which is then solved for leaf payoffs in the full Bluff(2,2) game.
In Bluff(2,2), the total number of histories |H| ≈ 1010.
9
Table 1: PTTT and Bluff game sizes and properties.
Game Abstr. Well-for. |A| Savings
DRP None Yes 2610 —
DRP DRP-IR Yes 860 67.05%
PTTT None Yes 11695314 —
PTTT FOSF Yes 9347010 20.08%
PTTT FOI No 1147530 90.19%
PTTT FOS No 1484168 87.31%
PTTT FOE No 47818 99.59%
Bluff None Yes 704643030 —
Bluff r = 10 No 295534218 58.06%
Bluff r = 8 No 108323418 84.63%
Bluff r = 6 No 22518468 96.80%
Bluff r = 4 No 2329068 99.67%
Bluff r = 3 No 543900 99.92%
Bluff r = 2 No 97608 99.97%
Bluff r = 1 No 12600 99.99%
6.1 Results
We consider several different imperfect recall abstractions for DRP, Skew-DRP(δ),
PTTT, and Bluff. For the DRP games, we apply DRP-IR and Skew-DRP-IR(δ) re-
spectively as described in Section 5. Our PTTT and Bluff experiments, however, also
investigate the effects of imperfect recall beyond skew well-formed games. In the full,
perfect recall version of PTTT, each player remembers the order of every failed and ev-
ery successful move she makes throughout the entire game. In our first abstract game,
FOSF, players forget the order of successive failures within the same turn. Clearly,
there is an isomorphism between any two merged information sets I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I) since
the order of the actions does not affect the available future moves or utilities. Players
still remember which turn each success and each failure occurred, and so the oppo-
nent’s sequences of actions must be equal across the isomorphism. Thus, FOSF is well-
formed. Our remaining PTTT abstractions, however, are not even skew well-formed.
In FOI, players independently remember the sequence of failures and the sequence of
successful actions, but not how the actions interleave. In FOS, players remember the
order of failed actions, but not the order of successes. Finally, in FOE, players only
know what actions they have taken and remember nothing about the order in which they
were taken. FOI, FOS, and FOE are not skew well-formed because no isomorphism
can preserve the order of the opponent’s previous information set, action pairs (break-
ing condition (iii) of Definitions 2 and 3). In Bluff, we use abstractions described by
Neller and Hnath (2011) that force players to forget everything except the last r bids.
Similarly, these abstract games are not skew well-formed because the players forget in-
formation that the opponent could previously distinguish. The size of each DRP, PTTT,
and Bluff game is given in Table 1. Here, A = {(I, a) : i ∈ N, I ∈ Ii, a ∈ A(I)} is
the set of all information set, action pairs. Note that Skew-DRP(δ) is the same size as
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Imperfect Recall (skew = 0.2)
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Figure 1: Sum of average regrets for both players as iterations increase for Skew-DRP-
IR(δ) (top), abstract games in PTTT (middle), and abstract games in Bluff (bottom).
Each graph uses a log scale on both axes. The vertical axes represent the sum of average
regret for both players in the corresponding full, unabstracted game, and horizontal
axes represent iterations.
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DRP regardless of the skew, and recall that CFR requires space linear in |A|.
For each game, we ran CFR1 on both players, meaning that each player’s oppo-
nent was an identical copy of the same no-regret learner. The sum of the average
regrets for each player over number of iterations is shown in Figure 1. The Skew-
DRP-IR(δ) experiments show that as δ increases, so does the regret as predicted by
Theorem 8, though
∑
I∈Ii
∣∣∣P˘(I)∣∣∣ δI appears to be a very loose bound on the final re-
gret. In PTTT, regret diverges from zero for FOI, FOS, and FOE, where FOS appears
to provide slightly better strategies than FOI and FOE. While our theory cannot explain
why FOS performs better, this does match our intuition that remembering information
about the opponent’s moves is important. For a small increase in average regret, FOS
reduces the space required by 87% compared to FOSF’s 20% reduction. Note that for
both DRP and PTTT, running CFR on the full, perfect recall game achieves the same
regret as in the well-formed abstractions (Skew-DRP-IR(0) and FSOF) and is thus not
shown. In Bluff, we see that regret consistently worsens as fewer previous bids are
remembered. This suggests that a result similar to Theorem 8 for skew-well-formed
games may hold if condition (iii) of Definition 2 is less constrained, though the proper
formulation for such a relaxation remains unclear. Nonetheless, choosing r = 8 saves
85% of the memory with only a very small increase in average regret after millions of
iterations.
7 Discussion
Well-formed games are described by four conditions provided in Definition 2. Recall
that Koller & Megiddo (1992) prove that determining a player’s guaranteed payoff in
an imperfect recall game is NP-complete. However, Koller & Megiddo’s NP-hardness
reduction creates an imperfect recall game that breaks conditions (i), (iii), and (iv) of
Definition 2. In this section, we discuss the following question: For minimizing regret,
how important is it to satisfy each individual condition of Definition 2?
Skew well-formed games and Theorem 8 show that one can relax condition (i)
of Definition 2 and still derive a bound on the average regret. In addition, most of
our PTTT and Bluff abstractions from the previous section do not satisfy condition
(iii), but CFR still produces reliable results. This suggests that it may be possible to
relax condition (iii) in a similar manner to the relaxation of condition (i) introduced by
skew well-formed games. While we leave this question open, we now demonstrate that
breaking condition (iii) can lead CFR to a dead-lock situation where one player has
constant average regret.
Let us walk through the process of applying CFR to the game in Figure 2. Note
that this game satisfies all of the conditions of Definition 2, except for condition (iii).
To begin, the current strategy profile σ1 is set to be uniform random at every infor-
mation set. Under this profile, when player 1 is at I3, each of the four histories are
equally likely. Thus, vi(σ1(I3→l), I3) = vi(σ
1
(I3→r), I3) = vi(σ
1, I3) = 0, and so
r11(I3, l) = r
1
1(I3, r) = 0. In addition, under σ
1, the counterfactual value of the pass
1Similar to Zinkevich et al. (2008), we used the chance sampling variant of CFR.
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Figure 2: A zero-sum game with imperfect recall where CFR does not minimize aver-
age regret. The utilities for player 1 are given at the terminal histories, where ξ ∈ (0, 1).
Nodes connected by a bold, dashed curve are in the same information set for player 1
(player 2 has perfect information).
(p) and continue (c) actions at both I1 and I2 is zero, and thus the immediate counter-
factual regrets at I1 and I2 on iteration 1 are also zero. Player 2, however, has positive
immediate counterfactual regret for passing (p) at histories ac and ec (to always receive
ξ utility) and for continuing (c) at bc and de (to always avoid receiving −ξ utility), and
has negative immediate counterfactual regret for continuing at ac and ec and for pass-
ing at bc and de. Therefore, the next profile σ2 still has player 1 playing uniformly
random everywhere, but player 2 now always passes at ac and ec, and always contin-
ues at bc and dc. On the second iteration of CFR, the positive regrets for player 1 at
I3 remain the same because the histories bcc and dcc are equally likely. Also, player
2’s positive regrets remain the same at all four histories in H2. However, player 1’s
expected utility for continuing at I1 or I2 is now negative since player 2 now passes
at ac and ec. Thus, player 1 gains positive regret for passing at both I1 and I2. This
leads us to the next profile σ3 = {(I1, p) = 1, (I2, p) = 1, (ac, p) = 1, (bc, p) =
0, (dc, p) = 0, (ec, p) = 1, (I3, l) = 0.5}. One can check that running CFR for more
iterations yields σt = σ3 for all t ≥ 3. The average regret for playing this way
will be constant and hence does not approach zero because player 1 would rather play
σ′1 = {(I1, p) = 1, (I2, p) = 0, (I3, l) = 0} and get u1(σ′1, σ32) = (1− ξ)/4 > u1(σ3)
for ξ ∈ (0, 1). A similar example can be constructed where condition (iii) holds, but
chance’s probabilities are not proportional (breaking condition (ii)).
Despite the problem of breaking condition (iii), condition (iv) of Definition 2 can be
relaxed. Rather than enforcing player i’s future information to be the same across the
bijection φ, we only require that the corresponding subtrees be isomorphic, allowing
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player i to re-remember information that was previously forgotten. The details for
this relaxation are in the supplementary material. However, it is not clear that this
relaxation is possible in skew well-formed games, nor does it seem to provide any
practical advantage.
8 Conclusion
We have provided the first set of theoretical guarantees for CFR in imperfect recall
games. We defined well-formed and skew well-formed games and provided bounds
on the average regret that results from applying CFR to such games. In addition, our
theory shows that we can achieve low average regret in a full, perfect recall game when
employing CFR on an abstract version of the game, provided the abstract game is skew
well-formed (with or without imperfect recall). Our DRP experiments confirm these
theoretical results, while our PTTT and Bluff experiments hint that it may be possible
to still bound regret in other types of imperfect recall games. Future work will look to
expand on the set of imperfect recall games to which CFR can be reliably applied. In
particular, it may be possible to derive regret bounds for a new class of games where
conditions (ii) and (iii) of Definition 2 are relaxed.
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Appendix A
In this section, we will prove Theorems 1 and 2 of the main paper. Note that by the
definition of counterfactual value, the regrets between Γ and a perfect recall refinement
Γ˘ are additive; specifically, for I ∈ Ii in Γ,
RTi (I, a) =
∑
I˘∈P˘(I)
RTi (I˘ , a). (5)
First, we provide a lemma that generalizes Theorem 4 of (Zinkevich et al., 2008) by
showing that if the immediate counterfactual regrets of each I˘ ∈ P˘(I) are proportional
up to some difference D, then the average regret can be bounded above:
Lemma A. Let Γ˘ be a perfect recall refinement of a game Γ. If for all I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈
P˘(I), and a ∈ A(I), there exist constants CI˘,I˘′,a, DI˘,I˘′,a ∈ [0,∞) such that
1
T
∣∣∣RT,+i (I˘ , a)− CI˘,I˘′,aRT,+i (I˘ ′, a)∣∣∣ ≤ DI˘,I˘′,a, (6)
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then the average regret in Γ˘ is bounded by
R˘Ti
T
≤ ∆iC
√|Ai|√
T
+
∑
I∈I
|P˘(I)|DI ,
where
C =
∑
I∈Ii
max
I˘,I˘′∈P˘(I),a∈A(I)
CI˘,I˘′,a
and
DI = max
I˘,I˘′∈P˘(I),a∈A(I)
DI˘,I˘′,a.
Proof.
R˘Ti ≤
∑
I˘∈I˘i
max
a∈A(I)
RT,+i (I˘ , a) by Theorem 3 of (Zinkevich et al., 2008)
=
∑
I∈Ii
∑
I˘∈P˘(I)
max
a∈A(I)
RT,+i (I˘ , a) by definition of a perfect recall refinement
≤
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|RT,+i (I˘∗, a∗) where I˘∗ = arg max
I˘∈P˘(I)
max
a∈A(I)
RT,+i (I˘ , a)
and a∗ = arg max
a∈A(I)
RT,+i (I˘
∗, a)
≤
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|
(
CI˘∗,I˘∗∗,a∗R
T,+
i (I˘
∗∗, a∗) + TDI˘∗,I˘∗∗,a∗
)
by (6),
where I˘∗∗ = arg min
I˘∈P˘(I)
RTi (I˘ , a
∗)
≤
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|CI˘∗,I˘∗∗,a∗
 1
|P˘(I)|
∑
I˘∈P˘(I)
RTi (I˘ , a
∗)
+ + T ∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|DI
because the minimum is less than the average and (·)+ is monotone increasing
=
∑
I∈Ii
CI˘∗,I˘∗∗,a∗R
T,+
i (I, a
∗) + T
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|DI by (5)
≤
∑
I∈Ii
CI˘∗,I˘∗∗,a∗T
√√√√√ ∑
a∈A(I)
(
RT,+i (I, a)
T
)2
+ T
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|DI
≤
∑
I∈Ii
CI˘∗,I˘∗∗,a∗∆i
√
|A(I)|
√
T + T
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|DI
by Theorem 6 of (Lanctot et al., 2009)
≤ ∆iC
√
|Ai|
√
T + T
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|DI .
Dividing both sides by T establishes the lemma. 
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Note that if Γ has perfect recall, then the constants CI,I,a = 1 and DI,I,a = 0 for all
I ∈ Ii and a ∈ A(I) satisfy the condition of Lemma A. In this case, C = |Ii| and
DI = 0, and so RTi /T ≤ ∆i|Ii|
√|Ai|/√T , recovering Theorem 4 of (Zinkevich et
al., 2008).
We now use Lemma A to prove Theorems 1 and 2:
Theorem 2. If Γ is skew well-formed with respect to Γ˘, then the average regret in Γ˘
for player i of choosing strategies according to CFR in Γ is bounded by
R˘Ti
T
≤ ∆iK
√|Ai|√
T
+
∑
I∈Ii
|P˘(I)|δI ,
where K =
∑
I∈Ii maxI˘,I˘′∈P˘(I) kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ and δI = maxI˘,I˘′∈P˘(I) δI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ .
Proof. We will show that for all I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I), and a ∈ A(I),
1
T
∣∣∣RT,+i (I˘ , a)− kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′RT,+i (I˘ ′, a)∣∣∣ ≤ δI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ , (7)
which, by Lemma A, proves the theorem.
Fix I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I), and a ∈ A(I). Firstly, for all z ∈ ZI˘ and σ ∈ Σ, by
conditions (ii) and (iii) of Definition 3, we have
piσ−i(z) = pic(z)
∏
(I,a)∈X−i(z)
σ(I, a)
= `I˘,I˘′pic(φ(z))
∏
(I,a)∈X−i(φ(z))
σ(I, a)
= `I˘,I˘′pi
σ
−i(φ(z)) (8)
and by condition (iv) of Definition 3, we similarly have
piσi (z[I˘], z) = pi
σ
i (φ(z)[I˘
′], φ(z)) (9)
and
piσi (z[I˘]a, z) = pi
σ
i (φ(z)[I˘
′]a, φ(z)). (10)
We can then bound the positive part of the immediate counterfactual regretRT,+i (I˘ , a)
above by
17
RT,+i (I˘ , a) =
(
T∑
t=1
rti(I˘ , a)
)+
=
 T∑
t=1
∑
z∈ZI˘
piσ−i(z)(pi
σ
i (z[I˘]a, z)− piσi (z[I˘], z))ui(z)
+
≤ (
T∑
t=1
∑
z∈ZI˘
`I˘,I˘′pi
σ
−i(φ(z))(pi
σ
i (φ(z)[I˘
′]a, φ(z))
− piσi (φ(z)[I˘ ′], φ(z)))(kI˘,I˘′ui(φ(z)) + δI˘,I˘′))
+
by equations (8), (9), (10), and condition (i) of Definition 3
= (
T∑
t=1
∑
z∈ZI˘′
`I˘,I˘′pi
σ
−i(z)(pi
σ
i (z[I˘
′]a, z)
− piσi (z[I˘ ′], z))(kI˘,I˘′ui(z) + δI˘,I˘′))
+
since φ is a bijection
≤
 T∑
t=1
∑
z∈ZI˘′
kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′pi
σ
−i(z)(pi
σ
i (z[I˘]a, z)− piσi (z[I˘], z))ui(z)
+
+
 T∑
t=1
∑
z∈ZI˘′
δI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′pi
σ
−i(z)(pi
σ
i (z[I˘]a, z)− piσi (z[I˘], z))
+
≤ kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′RT,+i (I˘ ′, a) +
T∑
t=1
δI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′pi
σ
−i(I˘
′)
≤ kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′RT,+i (I˘ ′, a) + TδI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ , (11)
where the last line follows because piσ−i(I˘
′) =
∑
z∈ZI˘′ pi
σ
−i(z[I˘
′]) ≤ 1 in a perfect
recall game Γ˘. Similarly,
RT,+i (I˘ , a) ≥ kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′RT,+i (I˘ ′, a)− TδI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′ , (12)
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which together with equation (11) and dividing by T establishes (7), completing the
proof. 
Note that Theorem 1 immediately follows from Theorem 2 since a well-formed game
is skew well-formed with δI˘,I˘′ = 0 for all I˘ , I˘
′ ∈ P˘(I).
Appendix B
In this section, we consider an alternative extension of well-formed games that relaxes
condition (iv) of Definition 2. For a subset of histories S ⊆ Hi, define
Di(S) = {I | I ∈ Ii,∃h ∈ S, h′ ∈ I such that h v h′}
to be the set of all information sets descending from any history in S.
Definition 4. For a game Γ and a perfect recall refinement Γˇ, we say that Γ is a nearly
well-formed game with respect to Γˇ if for all i ∈ N , I ∈ Ii, Iˇ , Iˇ ′ ∈ Pˇ(I), J ∈ Di(Iˇ),
there exist bijections φ : ZIˇ → ZIˇ′ , ψ : Di(Iˇ) → Di(Iˇ ′), ω : A(J) → A(ψ(J)) and
constants kIˇ,Iˇ′ , `Iˇ,Iˇ′ ∈ [0,∞) such that for all z ∈ ZIˇ :
(i) ui(z) = kIˇ,Iˇ′ui(φ(z)),
(ii) pic(z) = `Iˇ,Iˇ′pic(φ(z)),
(iii) In Γ, X−i(z) = X−i(φ(z)), and
(iv) Xi(z[Iˇ], z) = (J1, a1), ..., (Jm, am) if and only if
Xi(φ(z)[Iˇ
′], φ(z)) = (ψ(J1), ω(a1)), ..., (ψ(Jm), ω(am)).
We say that Γ is a nearly well-formed game if it is nearly well-formed with respect to
some perfect recall refinement.
In a nearly well-formed game, condition (iv) says that player i may now remem-
ber information that was once forgotten, provided the descendants from Iˇ and Iˇ ′ are
isomorphic across φ. This relaxes the corresponding condition for a well-formed game
where player i could never remember information once it was forgotten. Clearly, any
well-formed game is nearly well-formed by choosing ψ and ω to be the identity bijec-
tions.
For example, consider a longer version of DRP, DRP-3, that consists of three bet-
ting rounds instead of two where a third die is rolled at the beginning of round 3. We
then define DRP-IR-3 to be the imperfect recall abstraction of DRP-3 where during
round 2, players only know the sum of their two dice. In round 3, players once again
know the outcome of each individual die roll, recovering information from the first
round that was forgotten in the second. For instance, corresponding histories where
player i’s first two rolls were 1,5 and where her first two rolls were 4,2 will be in the
same information set during round 2, but will be in different information sets in round
3. However, betting is independent of dice rolls and utilities are only dependent on
the final sum of the three dice. Therefore, the descendants from these histories are
isomorphic across φ and thus DRP-IR-3 is nearly well-formed with respect to DRP-3.
CFR guarantees that the average regret is also minimized in nearly well-formed
games:
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Theorem 3. If Γ is nearly well-formed with respect to Γ˘, then the average regret in Γ˘
for player i of choosing strategies according to CFR in Γ is bounded by
RˇTi
T
≤ ∆iK
√|Ai|√
T
,
where K =
∑
I∈Ii maxIˇ,Iˇ′∈Pˇ(I) kIˇ,Iˇ′`Iˇ,Iˇ′ .
Proof. Fix I ∈ Ii, I˘ , I˘ ′ ∈ P˘(I), and a ∈ A(I). By conditions (ii) and (iii) of
Definition 4, equation (8) holds.
Claim: RTi (J, b) = kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′R
T
i (ψ(J), ω(b)) for all J ∈ Di(I˘), b ∈ A(J), T ≥ 0.
Provided the claim is true, we have
σT+1(J, b) =

RT,+i (J,b)∑
d∈A(J) R
T,+
i (J,d)
if
∑
d∈A(J)R
T,+
i (J, d) > 0
1
|A(J)| otherwise
=

kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′R
T,+
i (ψ(J),ω(b))∑
d∈A(J) kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′R
T,+
i (ψ(J),ω(b))
if
∑
d∈A(J) kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′R
T,+
i (ψ(J), ω(b)) > 0
1
|A(ψ(J))| otherwise
since ω is a bijection
= σT+1(ψ(J), ω(b)) (13)
for all J ∈ Di(I˘), b ∈ A(J), T ≥ 0. Therefore, for t ≥ 1,
piσ
t
i (z[I˘], z) =
∏
(J,b)∈Xi(z[I˘],z)
σt(J, b)
=
∏
(J,b)∈Xi(z[I˘],z)
σt(ψ(J), ω(b))
=
∏
(J,b)∈Xi(φ(z)[I˘′],φ(z))
σt(J, b) by condition (iv) of Definition 4
= piσ
t
i (φ(z)[I˘
′], φ(z)),
and thus equation (9) and similarly equation (10) hold for σ = σt. By following the
proof of Theorem 2, we then have that equations (11) and (12) with δI˘,I˘′ = 0 hold, and
hence equation (7) with δI˘,I˘′ = 0 holds. This establishes the theorem by Lemma A.
To complete the proof, we are left to show that the claim holds. We will do so by
induction on T . The base case T = 0 holds since R0i (I, a) = 0 for all I ∈ Ii, a ∈
A(I). For the inductive step, assume that RT−1i (J, b) = kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′R
T−1
i (ψ(J), ω(b))
for all J ∈ Di(I˘), b ∈ A(J). We will show that RTi (J, b) = kI˘,I˘′`I˘,I˘′RTi (ψ(J), ω(b))
for all J ∈ Di(I˘), b ∈ A(J).
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Fix J ∈ Di(I˘) and b ∈ A(J). By equation (13), we have for all z ∈ ZJ ,
piσ
T
i (z[J ], z) =
∏
(J′,b′)∈Xi(z[J],z)
σT (J ′, b′)
=
∏
(J′,b′)∈Xi(z[J],z)
σT (ψ(J ′), ω(b′)) by equation (13)
=
∏
(J′,b′)∈Xi(φ(z)[ψ(J)],φ(z))
σT (J ′, b′)
by condition (iv) of Definition 4 since Xi(z[J ], z) is a subsequence
(more precisely, a suffix) of Xi(z[I˘], z)
= piσ
T
i (φ(z)[ψ(J)], φ(z)) (14)
and similarly
piσ
T
i (z[J ]b, z) = pi
σT
i (φ(z)[ψ(J)]ω(b), φ(z)). (15)
Now consider the counterfactual regret at time T ,
rTi (J, b) =
∑
z∈ZJ
piσ
T
−i (z)(pi
σT
i (z[J ]b, z)− piσ
T
i (z[J ], z))ui(z)
=
∑
z∈ZJ
`I˘,I˘′pi
σT
−i (φ(z))(pi
σT
i (φ(z)[ψ(J)]ω(b), φ(z))
− piσTi (φ(z)[ψ(J)], φ(z)))kI˘,I˘′ui(φ(z))
by equations (14), (15) and conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Definition 4
= `I˘,I˘′kI˘,I˘′r
T
i (ψ(J), ω(b)).
Finally,
RTi (J, b) =
T∑
t=1
rti(J, b)
= RT−1i (J, b) + r
T
i (J, b)
= `I˘,I˘′kI˘,I˘′(R
T−1
i (ψ(J), ω(b)) + r
T
i (ψ(J), ω(b)))
by the induction hypothesis and the above
= `I˘,I˘′kI˘,I˘′
T∑
t=1
rti(ψ(J), ω(b))
= `I˘,I˘′kI˘,I˘′R
T
i (ψ(J), ω(b)),
establishing the inductive step. This completes the proof. 
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